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This is the second of two articles comparing the canonical rule of
error and the American decisional and statutory rules of fraud in mar-
riage. The first article, "Fraud and Error in the Canon Law of Mar-
riage," appeared in I CATHOLIC LAWYER 83 (April, 1955).
MUTATIONS OF THE RULE
OF FRAUD IN MARRIAGE
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., J.C.D.*
Voidable Marriages: A Jurisdictional Concept
F ROM earliest times until the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of
1857,1 direct adjudication of the validity of marriage was reserved in
England to the ecclesiastical courts. It appears, however, that the lay
courts would find a marriage null on certain limited grounds, where that
finding was collateral to a question properly before the common law
courts or the Chancery. Of course, the finding of nullity of marriage was
res judicata only between the parties to the suit in which that finding had
been made. An example of such collateral finding is that of the New York
Chancellor in Aymar v. Roff. 2
Chancellor Kent ruled upon a form of marriage entered into by a girl
under the age of 12, "as a frolic." She had disavowed her act before the
Master of Rolls on her twelfth birthday, and again before the Chancellor
some ten days later. The relief prayed and granted was not a direct declara-
tion of nullity, but a decree restraining the defendant from any contact
with the girl. It seems that the Chancellor founded his holding upon the
common law which, according to Blackstone,3 made void ab initio the
marriage of a girl under twelve.
A statute of Henry VIII, 4 whose direct purpose was to limit the extent
of certain canonical impediments to be adjudicated by the ecclesiastical
courts of the Anglican Church, had the indirect effect of clearly limiting
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany; Professor of Comparative Law in the Graduate
Division of the School of Law of St. John's University.
'20 & 21 Vict., c. 85.
2 3 Johns. Ch. 49 (N.Y. 1817).
BI. Comm. *436.
4 32 Henry VIII, c. 38 (1540).
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the respective competencies of the ecclesias-
tical and lay courts in matters of marriage.
The statute, in this latter respect, was not a
pure novelty, but it gave to the lay courts a
new power, predicated upon their acting to
enforce the Act of Parliament, to inhibit
petitioners from seeking decrees of nullity
in the ecclesiastical courts upon grounds
outside the statutory limits. More important
for our purposes here, the Henrician statute
limited collateral findings of nullity in the
lay courts to three grounds: want of age,
want of reason, and previous marriage with
the spouse surviving. To these, the Statute
4 & 5 Philip and Mary, c. 8, added the want
of consent of guardians of women less than
fifteen years of age. There the matter stood
in Blackstone's time, as he explains in Chap-
ter 15 of his Commentaries.
Blackstone here introduces us to the
terminology of "void marriage" and "void-
able marriage" which is to recur again and
again in the present discussion. In his time,
and in the common law received here at
the Revolution, a void marriage was one
whose nullity could be declared collaterally
in a lay court proceeding, while a voidable
marriage was one which could not be de-
clared null except by an ecclesiastical judge.
Neither in the common law nor in the
Canon Law was any marriage which had
been valid at its inception capable of dissolu-
tion by court decree.
Canonical Rule: Void for
Fraud in the Factuni
Marriages alleged to be null for fraud
were to be adjudicated in the ecclesiastical
forum only; they could not be attacked, even
collaterally, in a proceeding before a lay
tribunal. If such question there arose, the
proceeding halted until determination of that
incidental question was had in the church
court. The rule on fraud, or more properly
the rule on error, in those courts, was the
same as that in the Code of Canon Law to-
day. Marriage was a nullity if consent,
though apparent, was not real. Consent in
any of these four cases, and in these only,
was not real consent: consent not directed
to the person contemplated, consent directed
to a union other than marital, consent which
positive law made ineffective because based
upon error of servile status of the partner,
and consent vitiated by failure of a postulate
which had been made a condition sine qua
non.
In England the common usage was, even
when speaking of Canon Law, to employ
the term "fraud" instead of the canonically
correct term "error." Fraud, of course, in-
volves elements referable to two persons,
the deceiver and the person deceived. The
elements of materiality, falsity, and reliance,
pertain to the victim's consent. That there
was factual misrepresentation, made scien-
ter, with intent to cause the victim to act
thereon, has reference to the deceiver's
guilt. Because the object of inquiry of the
Canon Law in such cases of alleged nullity is
the act of consent, considerations referable
to the deceiver's guilt were not and are not
important. It is imperative to keep this dis-
tinction in mind when we set out to compare
the canonical rule in such cases with the
rules developed in American law. Also help-
ful to the reader whose background is the
common law is the similar distinction in
the common law of fraud: "Fraud in the
factum renders the writing void at law,
whereas fraud in the treaty renders it void-
able merely."5 The "factum" here is the
marriage itself, created by consent of the
parties; the "treaty" here includes all acts by
which one is induced to consent to marriage,
' Whipple v. Brown Bros. Co., 225 N.Y. 237, 241,
121 N.E. 748, 749 (1919) (per Collins, J.).
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all acts by which his consent is procured. In
the Canons, marriage is valid and never
voidable where there is real consent to
marry; marriage is never void or voidable
because the real consent was procured or
induced by error or by fraud, except in the
statutory case of error as to slavery.
Direct Decrees of Nullity in
Early American Courts
In the early years of American inde-
pendence, the state courts afforded in cases
of fraudulent marriage a single type of re-
lief, the decree of nullity. There were not
then statutes, such as have been later enacted
in many of the states, authorizing divorce
where a man married in ignorance of his
wife's previous unchastity,6 or making a nul-
lity ab initio and warranting divorce in any
marriage obtained by fraud,7 or empower-
ing the court to make a marriage void by its
decree where consent thereto had been ob-
tained by fraud.8 Therefore, the theory
underlying the action was then in the Amer-
ican courts, as it had been in the ecclesiasti-
cal courts of England and as it is now in the
tribunals of the Catholic Church, a singular
and simple theory: where there was, through
fraud in the factum, an appearance of con-
sent without its reality, there was a marriage
void ab initio.
In 1820, Chancellor Kent of New York
declared the nullity of a marriage which the
petitioner had entered while in a state of
mental derangement, from which state she
had recovered at the time of the action.9
Here, the Chancellor hesitated to decree
nullity upon the common law premises, for
the suit was "instituted purposely to declare
6 1 Md. Code 76, §25 (1860): Va. Code 530, §6
(1860).
' Ga. Code §§30-102, 30-103, 30-104.
'N.Y. Rev. Stat., Pt. 11, c. 8, tit. 1, §4 (1828).
'Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N.Y.
1820).
such a marriage void."' 10 He therefore predi-
cated his decree upon the general powers of
chancery in reference to lunatics. That
jurisdiction, he asserts, was inherent in
chancery, though direct adjudication of nul-
lity of marriage was reserved, in England,
to the ecclesiastical courts. Kent's assump-
tion is that in America, where no ecclesiasti-
cal courts are established by municipal law,
the latent matrimonial aspect of the chan-
cery jurisdiction of lunacy must be con-
sidered to come into free operation.
His successor, Chancellor Sanford, in
Ferlat v. Goian," makes a similar argument
to establish his power of decreeing nullity
of a marriage contracted under fraud and
duress. Here it is the general power of chan-
cery to adjudge the nullity of contracts
fraudulently executed, which is extended to
decree a marriage void, where, "in Eng-
land, the ecclesiastical courts would have
cognizance of such a question and would
annul the marriage. ' ' 12 Sanford's finding of
fact is well within the rule of fraud in the
English ecclesiastical courts: "though she
gave an apparent consent at the moment of
the celebration, yet it fully appears that this
consent was feigned . . . and that this mar-
riage was a foul fraud practiced upon her by
the defendant."13
In Clark v. Field,14 the Supreme Court of
Vermont, on an appeal from chancery,
reached a result quite similar as extending
chancery jurisidiction of void contracts to
declare nullity of a marriage celebrated with-
out real consent. The woman there was
shown to have understood and intended, to
the knowledge of the man, that she was not
married by the ceremony unless they should
o Id. at 346.
" 1 Hopk. Ch. 478 (N.Y. 1825).
"Id. at 495.
Id. at 493.
"13 Vt. 460 (1841).
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have another solemnization. The court
makes the point that she did not consent to
marriage in praesenti.'5
Chancellor Zabriskie of New Jersey, in
McClurg v. Terry,' 6 found that he had au-
thority to declare void a marriage solem-
nized by the parties acting in jest. He relied
upon the construction of chancery powers
in the Ferlat and Clark cases, and invoked a
grant implied in the State Constitution,
where the Chancellor was vested with chan-
cery powers withdrawn from the legislature.
The legislature had had power to declare
marriages void.17
The New York Chancellors had gone
beyond the powers of the lay judges of
England. Kent's holding of nullity in the
Wightman case was not collateral to the is-
suance of an injunction, as his finding of
nullity in the Aymar case had been. The de-
cision in Wightman v. Wightman was a di-
rect adjudication of the nullity of a lunatic's
marriage. Sanford, finding nullity for fraud
and duress in the Ferlat case, went further
and invaded the class of marriages which, in
Blackstone's classification,' 8 were voidable
only.
Kent, speaking obiter in the Wightman
case, had speculated that an American chan-
cellor might declare null any marriage con-
tracted contrary to natural law.' 9 But
Sanford held that the chancery powers over
lunatics' contracts and to declare nullity of
contracts void for fraud or duress marked
the limit of the New York chancellor's
power to adjudicate directly nullity of mar-
riage. He therefore found he had not juris-
diction to declare the nullity of a marriage in
Id. at 475.
"'21 N.J. Eq. (6 C.E. Greene) 225 (1870).
" Id. at 229.
I B1. Comm. *434 et seq.
Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 347-
351 (N.Y. 1820).
which the husband was alleged to be im-
potent.20 Referring to the Wightman and
Ferlat cases, he said, "These marriages were
clearly void; and this court pronounced the
sentence of nullity. If these two decrees are
denominated divorces, they do not arrogate
to this court any general power of divorce,
in cases not prescribed by our statutes."
2t
New York Statute: Voidable
Means Rescissible
The New York divorce statute to which
Sanford referred had been enacted in
1787; 2 the sole ground in the statute was
adultery. Another statute, enacted in
1788,23 implied that the courts had power of
declaring nullity of marriage, as it exempted
from the penalties of bigamy a person who
remarried "where the former marriage hath
been or shall be, by the sentence or decree
of any such court, declared to be void and
of no effect." The Commissioners to Revise
the Statute Laws noted Sanford's holding in
the Burtis case, "that the whole jurisdiction
of the court of chancery in relation to mar-
riage, except where the contract is void on
the same ground that other contracts may
be avoided, is conferred and limited by
statute. '24 They recommended that, in sev-
eral specified circumstances, the marriage
be in law, not absolutely void, but "void
from the time its nullity shall be declared
by a court of competent jurisdiction." 2 5
Included in this section, as enacted, were
marriages contracted in want of age or
understanding, in want of physical capacity,
and "when the consent of either party shall
'Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. 557 (N.Y. 1825).
21 Id. at 567.
2' Laws of N.Y. 1787, c. 69.
"Laws of N.Y. 1788, c. 24.
" 2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the Statute
Laws on N. Y., Report 2 (1828).
25 Ibid.
JULY, 1955
have been obtained by force or fraud. ' '2-1
The Revisors' note points out "some of these
marriages are absolutely void, by the exist-
ing law (referring to Blackstone, Commen-
taries, c. 15). But it is believed that the
interests of society and of the parties con-
cerned, will be best promoted by placing
them on the ground stated in this section." -2 7
Clearly, then, the purpose and effect of the
Revised Statutes were to make such mar-
riages voidable only, that is to say, they were
to be valid for all purposes in the law unless
and until a competent court should "declare
their nullity."'28
The New York law on fraudulent mar-
riage here departed from the theory under-
lying Sanford's decision in the Ferlat case,
which same theory he expounded more fully
in the Burtis opinion. The motives for the
change may have been good and proper in
the judgment of the Revisors and of the
Legislature. It has been suggested that the
motives were to afford the court more effec-
tive means of enforcing marital obligations
and of controlling collusive actions, espe-
cially where fraud or duress was the ground
asserted. But we are directly concerned here,
not with the sociological motives, but with
the juridical effect of the change. Fraudulent
marriage, under this New York statute, was
no longer void, and there was now no neces-
sity that the fraud be proved to have such
character as to make away with "the reality
of consent." The consent might be real
enough, but if it were fraudulently obtained,
it would be good ground for a decree. We
will later trace the vagaries of the New York
rule of fraud which followed upon this de-
parture from true declarations of nullity as
""N.Y. Rev. Stat., Pt. II, c. 8, tit. 1, §4 (1828).
"2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the State Laws
on N.Y., Report 3 (1828).
2 Ci. I Bishop, Marriage and Divorce §§258, 259
(1891); 1 BI. Comm.* 434.
the proper remedy in such cases and from
the theory that marriage procured by fraud
was either void ab initio or it was valid.
New Jersey Case: Rescission
by Chancery Power
A similar result was obtained in New
Jersey without aid of a statute.29 The magic
there was worked by invocation of two lines
of cases which are fundamentally incom-
patible. Judge Van Syckle, in dissent, re-
marks, "The cases (which we have listed as
the second line) ... are under a statute ex-
tending divorce power to cases of fraud, and
are, therefore, of no authority here."
30
The first line of cases comprises those
used above to indicate development of the
doctrine that chancery is competent to de-
clare on marriages void ab initio because
there was no real, but only apparent con-
sent.31 The second line of cases was decided
under statutes which empowered the courts
to grant divorce, or to dissolve marriage, or
to annul, as of the time of the decree, mar-
riages in which consent had been obtained
by fraud.32
The radical fallacy lies, as Van Syckle
pointed out, in confusing decrees of divorce
or dissolution with simple declarations of
the fact of nullity. Though the Massachusetts
statute spoke of marriages "supposed to be
void, or the validity ... doubted, either for
fraud or any legal cause," 33 the court said in
the Reynolds case, "The statute does not
'Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. (9 C.E. Greene)
516 (1873).
'o Id. at 532.
See notes I, 8, 10, 13, 15 supra.
Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87 (1859); Ritter v.
Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81 (Ind. 1839); Morris v. Morris,
Wright 630 (Ohio Ch. 1834); Donovan v. Dono-
van, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 140 (1864); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862).
' Mass. Stat. 1855, c. 27, reenacted in Gen. Stat.
c. 107, §4.
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provide that fraud shall vitiate a contract of
marriage, but only confers an authority on
the court to decree a dissolution of the mar-
riage for such cause, as in other cases of
nullity."'" And the California statute "...
provided that a divorce might be granted
'when the consent of either of the parties
to the marriage was obtained by force or
fraud, upon the application of the injured
party.' ,,3. The Indiana statute upon which
was based the decision in Ritter v. Ritter,:"!
which case is cited in the Reynolds decision,
"enacts that the Circuit Courts shall have
power to grant divorces for any other cause,
and in any other case, where the Court, in
their discretion, shall consider it reasonable
and proper. . . .' "" We have not seen the re-
port of the Morris case, 38 also cited in Rey-
nolds v. Reynolds, but Justice Field says of
it, "A divorce was decreed.... ,,39 Since in all
these cases, the court is not declaring a fac-
tual nullity but decreeing a dissolution, we
must insist that the requirement that real
consent shall have been lacking at the time of
celebration is quite beside the point. If the
court were to declare that the marriage is in
fact a nullity, it must find such fraud as made
the consent ineffective from the beginning.
But if the court is presuming to dissolve a
marriage, it need not find lack of true con-
sent; it is free, upon this premise, to dissolve
the marriage or not according as it finds or
does not find circumstances of injustice, in-
equity or even of hardship connected with
the fraud and sufficient to motivate reason-
ably the use of discretion.
The cases of this second line, like the case
before the New Jersey Court of Errors, were
of a peculiar type. All involved concealment
Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra note 32 at 606.
L5 Baker v. Baker, supra note 32 at 102.
Supra note 32.
Id. at 82.
" Supra note 32.
Baker v. Baker. sutpra note 32 at 104.
of premarital pregnancy by a man other than
the complainant, who had had no carnal
knowledge of his future wife. All the cases
advert to the horrendous result of sustaining
the marriage. The innocent dupe would be
forced to maintain bastardy proceedings to
free himself from responsibility for the child
thrust upon him, and be bound thereafter to
the woman he had thus publicly pilloried; or
he must in secret bitterness maintain the
child as his own. If ever there was an ex-
ample of the old saw "hard cases make bad




The making of a bad law is most clearly
illustrated in the decisions of Chief Justice
Bigelow in the Reynolds and Donovan mat-
ters. He draws a clear distinction in the
Donovan opinion between the rules of evi-
dence to be employed and the rule of mate-
riality to be applied. As to the first, "In
determining on the validity of such contract,
in order to ascertain whether it shall be
adjudged void on the ground of fraud under
Gen. Sts. c. 107, §4, the same rules of evi-
dence are to be applied as to other civil con-
tracts."' 45 As to the second, "There must be
satisfactory proof either of misrepresenta-
tion or concealment of some essential fact
•.. a particular fact which formed the basis
or contributed an essential ingredient to the
contract. . . .The fact that the respondent
was pregnant with child by a man other than
the petitioner at the time the contract of
marriage was entered into was material, and
went to the essence of the contract. This was
settled on full consideration in Reynolds v.
Reynolds."" In the Reynolds case, he had
said, "Nothing can then avoid it which does
4o Donovan v. Donovan, supra note 32.
,1 Ibid.
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not amount to a fraud in the essentialia of
the marriage relation."'14 2 He had ruled out
concealment of unchastity and false repre-
sentations of virtue as going to the essen-
tialia, but he went on to assert, "It is not
going too far to say, that a woman who has
not only submitted to the embraces of an-
other man, but who also bears in her womb
the fruit of such illicit intercourse, has dur-
ing the period of her gestation incapacitated
herself from making and executing a valid
contract of marriage with a man who takes
her as his wife in ignorance of her condition
and on the faith of representations that she
is chaste and virtuous. In such a case, the
concealment and false statement go directly
to the essentials of the marriage contract.
"". We have supplied emphasis in the
quotation to point out what seems to be the
only fulcrum of reasoned argument. It re-
peats in substance the argument of Justice
Field in Baker v. Baker.44 It assumes the old
ecclesiastical rule that the marriage is void
ab initio where real consent is lacking, but
we submit that it misapplies the rule. Where
a party is truly and permanently impotent at
the time of marriage, there might be made
out an argument that real consent was lack-
ing; one may be said to be incapable of con-
senting to do what he is incapable of doing.
But that a woman who is now capable of
intercourse, though for a time incapable of
conceiving the child of her husband, is in-
capable of consenting to marriage certainly
does not follow. If it did follow, no sterile
woman would be capable of marital consent,
and even one presently incapable of inter-
course by reason of temporary illness could
not validly marry.
The Civilians' Rule
The Chief Justice of Massachusetts re-
Reynolds v. Reynolds. supra note 32 at 608.
'I Id. at 609.
13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859).
jects as too severe the opinion of the com-
mentators on the civil law to the effect that
premarital unchastity of a woman is good
ground for "impeaching and vacating the
marriage." .4 5 Bigelow cites "Voet, 24, 2, 15"
as supporting that view which he rejects.
Yet when we turn to the writings of the
Dutch jurist at the place cited we find that
Voet's case is the same as Bigelow's: "On
the petition of one party, marriage should
be declared null by the public authority
whenever one has in ignorance married a
woman corrupted and made pregnant by
another, if, after discovering her violation,
he has not cohabited with her or in any
other way forgiven the offense."'4 6 Voet's
minor premise is the same as Bigelow's:
that the husband's error concerns a matter
which goes to the essence of marriage. It
seems not impertinent that we examine
Voet's development of the argument.47
Voet points out that such a marriage is
held valid in the Canon Law of the Catho-
lic Church. 48 Voet argues that it should not
be so because the Canon Law held invalid
a marriage contracted by a freeman with a
slave, if the free person were ignorant of
the other's servile condition. 49 He ignores
the fact that Catholic theologians and can-
onists have always held that the nullity of
such a marriage does not result from any
natural insufficiency of the freeman's con-
sent, but from a positive impediment estab-
" Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra note 32 at 608.
"4 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandictas 127 (4th
ed. Bassoni, Remonini, 1827).
"7 The views expressed by Voet were also expressed
by Beza and Brouwer. According to Philip A.
Putnam, Assistant Librarian of the Harvard Law
School Library, the works of all three jurists were
accessible to Chief Justice Bigelow at the library
in Cambridge in 1862.
4 c. Quod autem, C. 29, q. 1, of the Decree of
Gratian.
4'cc. 3, 4 C. 29, q. 2; compare Canon 1083, §2 n.
2, C.I.C.
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lished by church law." Voet bolsters his
argument by an appeal to the Roman Law "
which permitted an action for restitution to
the buyer of a woman slave represented to
be a virgin but found not to be in that con-
dition. Surely the case is not parallel. A man
marrying establishes a peculiar personal re-
lation between himself and the woman he
marries; there is no such personal relation
between the buyer and the property he pur-
chases. Further, it is not clear that the buy-
er's action for restitution indicates that the
sale was a nullity; rather it seems to have
imposed an affirmative duty upon the seller
to hand back the price upon surrender of
the slave. Finally, Voet relies upon the text
of Deuteronomy, 22; 20,21 and the Novella
(93) of the Emperor Leo. The Scripture
text, especially when compared with other
verses in the same chapter where similar
penalties of death were imposed upon the
guilty woman whether she was actually
married or only espoused, whereas such sins
when committed by girls who were neither
married nor engaged were not punished by
death, indicates that the offense is techni-
cally an adultery. The usual bill of divorce
is not mentioned, for the woman is executed
immediately upon her conviction. The Em-
peror's decree had no reference to voiding
or dissolving a marriage, but permitted an
offended fiance to rescind his engagement
and refuse to marry the violated woman.12
Not all the classical Protestant jurists
were of Voet's opinion. Pufendorf remarks
upon the law of Deuteronomy discussed
above, calling it "Jewish civil Law, '" and
"very peculiar." His'exposition of the "law
' Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Suppl. Q. 52 A. 2, 6.
' Digest 19. 1. 11.5.
12 3 Corpus Juris Civilis 823 (Leipzig, 1854).
"' Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and Nations
587 (4th ed., Kennett transl., 1729). The phrase
suggests that Pufendorf believed the law was in-
tended to operate only within the Jewish nation.
of nature" runs very close to what we have
seen to be the Canon Law: "In like man-
ner, if there were a Mistake, either as to
the Person, the Object of Consent, or in
any Quality, either relating to Matrimony
itself, or serving as a Condition on which
the Consent was built . . . the contract
was manifestly void."5 4
The New York Rules
Because the relief of annulment of mar-
riage for fraud has had its widest use and
broadest development in New York, our
discussion of the mutations of the materi-
ality rule in such actions will be limited
to the jurisprudence of that state only. In
the New York courts, it seems, four gen-
eral rules of materiality have operated: the
essentialia rule, the consent rule, the Grif-
fin rule, and the rule of matters vital to
the consent.
Fraud Going to the
Essence of the Contract
The essentialia rule is perhaps most
clearly stated in Fisk v. Fisk.5 " There it
was said, "the rule is well settled that no
fraud will avoid a marriage which does not
go to the very essence of the contract, and
which is not in its nature such a thing as
either would prevent the party from enter-
ing into the marriage relation, or, having
entered into it, would preclude performance
of the duties which the law and custom
imposes upon the husband or the wife as a
party to that contract."'5 , In that case, the
defendant wife had been previously mar-
tied and validly divorced, while the plain-
tiff supposed she had never been married;
she was, therefore, in the law, capable of
marriage with him, and so relief was
'4Ibid.
6 App. Div. 432, 39 N.Y. Supp. 537 (Ist Dep't
1896).
Id. at 434, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 539 (emphasis
added).
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denied. The holding had been the same in
an earlier similar case.5 7 But the second
marriage was bigamous and void where
the divorced person was under prohibition
to marry,58 and where the defendant had
left a wife abroad and it was not known
whether she was alive or dead when he
remarried. 9
It was held that the defendant was inca-
pacitated for marriage where she was preg-
nant by another at the time.60 Marriage was
annulled where one party had, when marry-
ing, intentions to reject the marital obliga-
tions totally,6 ' or with reference to the pro-
creation of children.6 2
Venereal disease has been held to inca-
pacitate a person for marriage. 3 Sterility 4
and that sort of epilepsy which does not
7 Clarke v. Clarke, 11 Abb. Pr. 228 (N.Y. 1860).
'Blank v. Blank, 107 N.Y. 91, 13 N.E. 615
(1887); Roth v. Roth, 97 Misc. 136, 161 N.Y.
Supp. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
' Minner v. Minner, 238 N.Y. 529, 144 N.E. 181
(1924).
' Shrady v. Logan, 17 Misc. 329, 40 N.Y. Supp.
1010 (Sup. Ct. 1896); cf. Reynolds v. Reynolds,
supra note 32.
6 1Feynman v. Feynman, 168 Misc. 210, 4 N.Y.S.
2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Lewine v. Lewine, 170
Misc. 120, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Ryan
v. Ryan, 156 Misc. 251, 281 N.Y. Supp. 709 (Sup.
Ct. 1935); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 186 N.Y. Supp.
470 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Moore v. Moore, 94 Misc.
370, 157 N.Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Robert
v. Robert, 87 Misc. 629, 150 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
62 Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. 249, 297 N.Y. Supp.
744 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Miller v. Miller, 132 Misc.
121, 228 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
' Meyer v. Meyer, 49 How Pr. 311 (N.Y. 1875).
"Chavias v. Chavias. 194 App. Div. 904, 184
N.Y. Supp. 761 (2d Dep't 1920): Wendel v.
Wendel, 30 App. Div. 477, 52 N.Y. Supp. 72 (2d
Dep't 1898); Schroter v. Schroter, 56 Misc. 69,
106 N.Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Devanbagh
v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige Ch. 554 (N.Y. 1836).
render sexual relations dangerous 6 5 do not
incapacitate a person for marriage.
It was held that the plaintiff, who, be-
cause of her religious beliefs, felt she could
not permit sexual relations to a man she
had married in a civil ceremony, was bound
to the marriage though he refused religious
solemnization.66
It will be seen that the statement of the
essentialia rule in the Fisk case brings it
well within the ancient rule that there is
nullity where consent is only apparent and
not real. Some of the applications cited are
not within the Canon Law rule of substan-
tial error because they go beyond the
canonical concept of matrimonial capacity,
as in the case of a divorced person whose
spouse survives; or because they are prem-
ised on facts which in the canonical view
are not substantial to the marital relation,
such as pregnancy at the time of marriage
and venereal infection; or because the sub-
stantial nature of the canonical require-
ment of religious celebration is not recog-
nized. In spite of such applications of the
rule, the spirit of the ancient principle sur-
vives where the object of inquiry is a fraud
touching the "factum" of the contract, and
causing nullity ab initio.
Fraud Procuring the Consent
The consent rule, as usually stated and
applied, looks to fraud in the "treaty,"
which fraud is said to warrant dissolution
or rescission of the marriage. In DiLorenzo
v. DiLorenzo,6 7 the court declared, "it is
sufficient that we rely upon the plain pro-
' Lapides v. Lapides. 254 N.Y. 73. 171 N. E. 911
(1930); McGill v. McGill. 179 App. Div. 343.
166 N.Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't 1917). afl'd men..
226 N.Y. 673, 123 N.E. 877 (1919).
0' Mirizio v. Mirizio. 242 N.Y. 74, 84, 150 N.E.
605, 609 (1926).
6' 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
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vision of our statute and upon the applica-
tion to the case of a contract of marriage
of those salutary and fundamental rules,
which are applicable to contracts generally
when determining the validity. If the plain-
tiff proves to the satisfaction of the court
that, through misrepresentation of some
fact, which was an essential element in the
giving of his consent to the contract of mar-
riage and which was of such a nature as
to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, he
has been victimized, the court is empow-
ered to annul the marriage."6 8
Decree of annulment was here granted,
as the man's consent to marry was pro-
cured by false representations that he was
father of the child of which the woman had
been delivered before the marriage. The
court found that the plaintiff had had a
"right to rely" upon the woman's state-
ment, though an earlier case"9 had denied
a man such relief where he (like the plain-
tiff in DiLorenzo's case) had had warning
of the woman's bad character through her
submission to him in pre-marital relations.
That earlier view was adopted by the Su-
preme Court in a 1933 decision70 notwith-
standing the ruling in DiLorenzo.
Domschke v. Domschke71 extended the
DiLorenzo rule to a woman's representa-
tion that she had been married and had
borne her child in wedlock, where she had
never been other than mistress to the
child's father.
Concealment of prior divorce was held
material under this rule, though the person
78 Id. at 474-475, 67 N.E. at 65.
'Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. 218, 23 N.Y. Supp. 597
(Super. Ct. 1893).
-0 Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 134, 263 N.Y.
Supp. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
" 138 App. Div. 454, 122 N.Y. Supp. 892 (2d
Dep't 1910).
who had obtained the decree was clearly
not legally incapable of contracting a sec-
ond time.7 2 There was a similar holding
where the defendant had concealed annul-
ment of an earlier marriage.7 3
Where the man had concealed a disease
involving sterility after the woman had in-
quired of his capacity to beget a child, an-
nulment was granted. 74
Even before the DiLorenzo case, courts
of first instance had held that the continu-
ance of criminal activity after marriage
gave ground for an annulment action by
the other party, 75 though that view had
been reproved by the judges of the Appel-
late Division in the Fisk opinion. 76 After
the DiLorenzo case was decided, the Ap-
pellate Division found no difficulty in grant-
ing annulments where the fraud had to do
with criminal character, at least when the
criminality was found to be of a particu-
larly aggravated sort: drug addiction 77 and
a record of seven felony convictions.
78
Without discussing the question of in-
capacity to contract, the court found that
failure to disclose an infection of venereal
disease, though there had been no inquiry
and no affirmative representation, would be
72 Costello v. Costello, 155 Misc. 28, 279 N.Y.
Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"Weill v. Weill, 104 Misc. 561, 172 N.Y. Supp.
589 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
" Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 611 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
" King v. Brewer, 8 Misc. 587, 29 N.Y. Supp. 1114
(Super. Ct. 1894); Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355,
26 N.Y. Supp. 910 (Super. Ct. 1893).
" Fisk v. Fisk, 6 App. Div. 432, 436, 39 N.Y.
Supp. 537, 540 (1st Dep't 1896).
71 O'Connell v. O'Connell, 201 App. Div. 338, 194
N.Y. Supp. 265 (1st Dep't 1922).
78Harris v. Harris, 201 App. Div. 880, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 936 (1st Dep't 1922).
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sufficient fraud to warrant annulment of
marriage. 79
A 1928 statute8 0 gave to the sane spouse
an action for dissolution when the other
was insane at the time of marriage or later.
In adjudicating a marriage contracted be-
fore this enactment it was held that if the
defendant had suffered insanity before the
marriage, but being sane at that time, con-
cealed the earlier affliction, there was fraud
sufficient to warrant annulment. 8'
If there had been justified reliance upon
a misrepresentation of intent to have a re-
ligious ceremony - not a sincere promise
later broken8 '2 - the court found such fraud
as would ground action for annulment."'
The Griffin Rule
"The Griffin rule"8 4 had a short life. It
applied to unconsummated marriages the
DiLorenzo standard and to consummated
marriages a rule of public policy stated
in terms of the essentials of the marital
status.8 - It was formulated in Special Term,
and was never directly embraced by the
Court of Appeals or by the Appellate Divi-
sion. The courts had for many years in-
voked the distinction between causes suffi-
cient to annul an unconsummated marriage
and those required where the marriage con-
'"Jacobson v. Jacobson. 207 App. Div. 238, 202
N.Y. Supp. 96 (2d Dep't 1923).
" Laws of N.Y. 1928. c. 589, incorporated in N.Y.
Dom. Re]. Law §7(5).
SAlter v. Alter, 250 App. Div. 428, 294 N.Y.
Supp. 195 (2d Dep't 1937).
s Schachter v. Schachter, 109 Misc. 152, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
' Rutstein v. Rutstein, 221 App. Div. 70, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 688 (1st Dep't 1927).
" So called in Gershenson, Fraud in the New York
Law of Annulment, 9 B'klyn L. Rev. 51 (1939).
5 Griffin v. Griffin, 122 Misc. 837, 204 N.Y. Supp.
131 (Sup. Ct.), af0'd inem., 209 App. Div. 883,
205 N.Y. Supp. 926 (2d Dep't 1924).
tract "had ripened into the marital status."
Actually it was no more than a policy state-
ment, for it is a commonplace that the
parties have all the rights and duties of
status immediately upon a valid contract., '
The Griffin rule, when it was stated in
1924, seemed to offer a formula for some
restraint upon the almost pure common
contract doctrine advanced in DiLorenzo,
and followed in the Svenson and Domschke
cases. Only one recent case invokes the
Griffin rule, and it is there applied in reject-
ing a petition alleging misrepresentation in
pre-marital promises of the woman to re-
main a dutiful wife. Apparently the mar-
riage had been consummated, and the court
held that in the circumstance fraud was not
material unless it went to the essentials of
the contract.87
Fraud in an Element
Vital to Consent
The field seems now to be held by the
"vital consent" rule. The older public pol-
icy doctrine, stated in Keyes v. Keyes,""
was recalled in Sobol v. Sobol8 9 and was
restated by the Court of Appeals in Lapides
v. Lapides,90 in the following terms, "While
tile law books may treat marriage as a civil
contract, yet it is a contract which the pub-
lic is interested in preserving. The fraud
which may dissolve the marriage tie must
relate to something vital."91
s' See Schonfeld v. Schonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 482,
184 N.E. 60, 62 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
s' Washburn v. Washburn, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
6 Misc. 355, 26 N.Y. Supp. 910 (Super. Ct.
1893).
s"'88 Misc. 277, 279, 150 N.Y. Supp. 248, 249
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
°254 N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 911 (1930).
1 1d. at 80, 171 N.E. at 913.
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Some of the misrepresentations which
have been held vital in recent cases are
these: the man had said he would afford
a good home for the middle-aged woman
and her children in a congenial atmos-
phere;92 the wife who had been silent before
marriage on the matter of children, after-
ward insisted on the right to decide when
she should become pregnant; 93 concealment
of guilt of the crime of rape struck directly
at the happiness of the marital relation,
though nine years had elapsed since the
marriage.94
The courts have held the following mis-
representations not vital: as to wealth, fam-
ily, social position, and that the man, before
marriage, had not accepted money from
other women; 95 that the man was of Polish
descent when actually he was German;""';
failure to disclose mental illness, not in the
person married, but in members of the
family.97
It was said that there was no right to
rely on representations that there would be
a religious ceremony later, as the petitioner
had not exercised the care of an ordinarily
prudent person to determine the genuinity
of the other's willingness to have the cere-
mony.98 It was held to be contrary to public
policy to grant an annulment because a
vife after marriage refused to keep a pre-
marital promise. She had said that for the
'-Waff v. Waft, 189 Misc. 372, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 775
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
0 Schulman v. Schulman, 180 Misc. 904, 46 N.Y.S.
2d 158 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
" Giannotti v. Giannotti, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
00Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff,
303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E. 2d 877 (1952).
'Pawloski v. Pawloski, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 413 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
"Natoli v. Natoli, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 708 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
" Vonbiroganio v. Von Brock, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 885
(Sup. Ct. 1946).
sake of her husband's happiness, she would
give in adoption another man's child of
which she was pregnant at the time of her
marriage.9
There was found to be no fraud on the
petitioner where, though a previous mar-
riage was concealed on the license applica-
tion, the fact had been known to him; 100
nor where the woman married knowing the
man drank, though it was only after mar-
riage she discovered he had been twice con-
victed for intoxication more than five years
before the marriage. 10'
The Right to Rely and
Conditioned Consent
The basic doctrine of the consent rule as
enunciated in the DiLorenzo case, that
failure of a motive or cause for which one
consents to the marriage will make the
marriage voidable, is rejected by the Canon
Law, as it was in the common law. But
those cases under the consent rule which
predicate the "right to rely" upon a repre-
sentation made after inquiry follow a ra-
tionale not entirely dissimilar from that of
the canonists treating of marriage made
void by failure of a condition sine qua non.
Thus, the Domschke decision intimates that
a man may stipulate for the chastity of the
woman he marries.10 2 The Williams deci-
sion found that the woman had inquired of
her fiance's ability to beget a child.' 03 In
the Smith case, there had been particular
inquiry as to the health of the woman, and
Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 699 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
1
"Factor v. Factor, 184 Misc. 861, 55 N.Y.S. 2d
183 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10' Trefry v. Trefry, 189 Misc. 1013, 76 N.Y.S. 2d
323 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
102Domschke v. Domschke, 138 App. Div. 454,
457, 122 N.Y. Supp. 892, 895 (2d Dep't 1910).
103 Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 611, 613
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
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as to the presence of "anything going to
come between us to make life unhappy.' 0 4
None of these circumstances, upon its face,
indicates clearly a determination in the
mind of the injured party to contract mar-
riage only if the other were chaste, or fer-
tile, or in sound mental health. But all of
them suggest a doubt entertained before
marriage concerning the condition inquired
of, and with proper evidence it might have
been shown that the doubt had been so
serious and the determination so strong
that the condition made an object of in-
quiry had been made also an effective con-
dition sine qua non.
Conclusions
The present New York situation pleases
no one. So small a proportion of the de-
cided cases are reported that it is practi-
cally impossible to determine with certainty
what rules or policies are generally con-
trolling in the decisions of the trial judges.
Some of those who advocate as an ultimate
desideratum a "legal provision for di-
vorce by mutual consent" limited only by
use of a conciliation service, provision for
the children's welfare and fair adjustment
of property rights, complain that some trial
judges are applying the "essentialia" rule of
materiality and "imposing unjustifiably
severe moral standards as a basis for find-
ing the petitioner's hands too 'unclean' for
relief in equity."'"" Others feel that the
findings of trial courts sometimes exceed
even the limits of the very liberal rule of
considerations "vital" to the consent, and
that the standards of proof are often very
low.
Whatever be the fact as to the actual
practice of the trial judges, it seems clear
'"' Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 373, 184 N.Y.
Supp. 134, 136 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
1 See Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 900, 915-917 (1948).
that the rule recognized by the appellate
courts, requiring that the fraud be "vital"
to the consent, affords no clearly objective
standard for limiting the pure "consent"
rule laid down in the DiLorenzo case.
Whether or not the inferior courts are ac-
tually attempting to apply the standards
established, there is no doubt that the stand-
ards themselves are so broad as to give the
judges a scope of discretion which has little
limit short of their views of social expedi-
ency. The judges have now, in the area of
fraud, a power, which in 1827 was exer-
cised by the legislature, to regulate mar-
riage under no more definite standard than
the "interests of society and of the parties
concerned."1'0
The logic of this development was in-
exorable, if not always obvious, once the
law departed from the canonical and com-
mon law concept that marriage validly con-
tracted cannot be avoided or dissolved. The
fallacy pointed out by Judge Van Syckle'
0 7
which confuses the decree of nullity with
decrees of divorce or dissolution, has en-
trapped our people and our legislature by
causing them to insist upon a strict divorce
statute while accepting complacently an an-
nulment statute whose limits are as vague
in doctrine as they are vagrant in appli-
cation. And the fallacy has so ensnared
some of our legal minds that they reject or
at least fail to comprehend a principle once
a commonplace in marriage law and still
clearly effective in contract and agency doc-
trines: that a contractual or consensual re-
lation is radically void and a nullity always
if, and only if, the consent of the parties is
wanting.
'° 2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the Statute
Laws on N.Y., Report 3 (1828).
107 Carris v. Carris. 24 N.J. Eq. (9 C.E. Greene)
516, 532 (1873).
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